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Imperfect Models: The Kingston Lunatic Asylum Scandal and the Problem of 
Postemancipation Imperialism 
In the spring of 1858, Dr. Lewis Quier Bowerbank applied for the position of consulting 
surgeon at the Kingston Public Hospital. The son of a Jamaican parish rector, Bowerbank had 
received his medical education from the University of Edinburgh, with additional training in 
London. Upon returning to Jamaica later in 1836, he practiced medicine in the capital of 
Spanish Town before moving in 1853 to Kingston, the island’s major port city, where he 
established a medical practice with his brother-in-law. He also served as a member of the 
island’s Central Board of Health. But when he applied to become consulting surgeon at the 
Public Hospital, the commissioners rejected Bowerbank and left the post vacant. Just two 
days later, Bowerbank published a scathing exposé of endemic neglect and malpractice 
within the hospital and adjoining lunatic asylum. Bowerbank’s Letter to the Commissioners 
of the Public Hospital and Lunatic Asylum of Kingston, Jamaica relative to the present State 
and Management of these Institutions sparked a years-long controversy over the general 
conditions in the hospital and asylum.1 Within that broader controversy, one particular aspect 
                                                        
1 The National Archives, Colonial Office (CO) 137/338/204, Darling to Edward Bulwer-
Lytton, 9 August 1858; Leonard Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism: Managing Mental 
Disorder in the Post-Emancipation British Caribbean, 1838–1914 (New York, 2014), 54; 
Lewis Quier Bowerbank, A Letter to the Commissioners of the Public Hospital and Lunatic 
Asylum of Kingston, Jamaica relative to the present State and Management of these 
Institutions by Lewis Quier Bowerbank, M.D. (Kingston, 1858), CO 137/342/434, J.W. Perry 
to CO, 24 June 1858. Biographical sketch drawn from his obituary, “Death of the Honble. Dr. 
Bowerbank,” Daily Gleaner, 11 October 1880, 2; from “History of Medicine in Jamaica,” 
Medical Association of Jamaica Supplement to the Daily Gleaner, 13 June 1991, 3. 
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of institutional practice emerged as the subject of intense focus and eventually became the 
source of imperial scandal: the cruel and abusive treatment of women patients in the lunatic 
asylum.2 
Medicine was not usually the stuff of imperial scandal. Like political scandals in 
Britain, imperial scandals often started with salacious charges of sexual impropriety that 
gradually shifted toward more weighty accusations of corruption.3 But if medicine was not a 
frequent generator of scandal, torture—and especially the torture of women—was.4 The most 
important revelations of the Kingston lunatic asylum scandal concerned the torture and abuse 
of vulnerable black women and shone light on administrative misconduct. Moreover, its 
ramifications mushroomed far beyond the island. As scholars have noted, scandals allowed a 
public working out of boundaries of appropriate behavior. The issue of respectability was 
especially salient in colonial contexts, where morality was seen as one of the key distinctions 
between metropolitan and colonial life. It was widely accepted that many British colonies—
and Jamaica in particular—were hotbeds of corruption and vice. The supposed purity of 
British social life was protected by the oceans that separated the metropole from the 
                                                        
2 A note on terms: while patients in Kingston’s asylum are frequently described in the 
documents as “lunatics” or “insane,” I only use these terms where they appear in the sources. 
In recognition of the imprecision with which this term was applied, I will refer to the people 
in the asylum as “patients,” “inmates” (a term found in the records), and “residents.” 
3 Linda J. Colley, “Gendering the Globe: The Political and Imperial Thought of Philip 
Francis,” Past and Present 209 (Nov. 2010): 117–148, at 117–119; Anna Clark, Scandal: The 
Sexual Politics of the British Constitution (Princeton, 2004). 
4 James Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic 
during the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, 2012). 
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corrupting colonies. Scandals—whether about imposters, sexual impropriety, or torture—
disrupted this status quo. Acceptance of looser standards and regulations could only be tacit, 
whereas scandals of this sort pressed these issues publicly and so required firm rebukes. 
Furthermore, scandal legitimized empire by shifting attention to individual misdeeds rather 
than the crime of imperialism itself.5  
Scandals were also well-documented, and because of the voluminous archival records 
produced about the Kingston scandal, a spate of historians have outlined the lineaments of 
this scandal in a series of recent works. Bowerbank spent over two years trying to convince 
authorities that conditions within the asylum—and the adjoining hospital—required 
immediate intervention. His crusade divided Kingston’s elite, pitting the Jamaican 
government—whose inadequacies Bowerbank blamed for the institution’s failures—against 
members of the city’s medical community. It also led to the discovery of physical abuse in 
the asylum, with the worst violence against asylum patients coming to light years into the 
scandal. Once confirmed, these revelations forced reluctant imperial officials to intervene. 
Following a local commission’s exhaustive examination of both institutions, the Colonial 
Office sent questionnaires to the governors of more than thirty colonies, asking about abuses 
within their local asylums.6 This was a remarkable, though temporary, result, one at odds 
                                                        
5 Kirsten McKenzie, Scandal in the Colonies: Sydney and Cape Town, 1820–1850 (Carlton, 
2004); Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain 
(Cambridge, MA, 2006), prologue and chapter 1. 
6 See Margaret Jones, Public Health in Jamaica, 1850–1940: Neglect, Philanthropy and 
Development (Kingston, 2013); idem, “The Most Cruel and Revolting Crimes: The 
Treatment of the Mentally Ill in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Jamaica,” Journal of Caribbean 
History 42, no. 2 (2008): 290–309; Smith, “Caribbean Bedlam: The Development of the 
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with the hardening racial ideologies and narrowing liberalism of the late 1850s and early 
1860s. For this reason, some scholars see these events as a foundational moment in the 
development of a rudimentary imperial public health policy that also injects the 
historiographies of colonial medicine and psychiatry with an evocative case study from the 
British Caribbean, a region these fields have too often ignored in favor of India, Africa, and 
the dominions.7 
                                                        
Lunatic Asylum System in Britain’s West Indian Colonies, 1838–1914,” Journal of 
Caribbean History 44, no. 1 (2010): 1–47; Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism; Sally 
Swartz, “The Regulation of British Colonial Lunatic Asylums and the Origins of Colonial 
Psychiatry, 1860-1864,” History of Psychology 13, no. 2 (2010): 160–77. 
7 For more on what the British Caribbean uniquely brings to the subject of colonial medicine, 
see Juanita de Barros, Steven Palmer, and David Wright, eds., Health and Medicine in the 
circum-Caribbean, 1800–1868 (New York, 2009). For important studies of asylums and 
psychiatric policy in India, Africa, and the dominions, see Waltraud Ernst, Mad Tales from 
the Raj: The European Insane in British India, 1800–1858 (London, 1991); James H. Mills, 
Madness, Cannabis and Colonialism: The “Native-Only” Lunatic Asylums of British India, 
1857–1900 (Basingstoke, 2000); Megan Vaughan, Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and 
African Illness (Stanford, 1991); Jock McCulloch, Colonial Psychiatry and ‘The African 
Mind’ (Cambridge, 1995); Swartz, “The Black Insane in the Cape, 1891–1920,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 21, no. 3 (Sep. 1995): 399–415; Jonathan Sadowsky, Imperial 
Bedlam: Institutions of Madness in Colonial Southwest Nigeria (Berkeley, 1999); Stephen 
Garton, Medicine and Madness: A Social History of Insanity in New South Wales, 1880–1940 
(Kensington, 1988); Catharine Coleborne, Reading “Madness”: Gender and Difference in 
the Colonial Asylum in Victoria, Australia, 1848–1888 (Perth, 2007); idem, Madness in the 
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Yet the way the scandal unfolded, and the terms on which its debates rested, belie 
these conclusions. For at stake was a disagreement about the standard of care that colonial 
institutions had to provide and the question whether these facilities had an obligation to apply 
the latest models emanating from the metropole. Attempts to export medical standards from 
the metropole to the colonies were inherently flawed. In the case of Kingston, while there 
was widespread approval of the new standards developed for asylum management developed 
in Britain, commentators fiercely disagreed about whether it was possible or even desirable to 
reform Jamaica’s asylums to match British guidelines. That there was so much disagreement 
on this point was not simply a product of the colonial context, however, for the training of 
local authorities and doctors in British methods was not always controversial.8 Yet even in 
Britain, asylum practices remained the subject of significant debate and often haphazard 
execution. They were not the monolithic and stable pillars of knowledge, tested and refined 
in the metropole, that Jamaican commentators and imperial bureaucrats implied. Thus the 
debate about whether British models were applicable to colonial contexts was not simply 
about the differences between metropole and colony or about the changing views of 
freedpeople; it also reflected the instability of those ideas themselves.  
Crucially, the scandal crystallized debates over what postemancipation imperial 
governance was supposed to accomplish. Bowerbank’s crusade assigned the task of 
overseeing asylum conditions and practices—and making them conform to metropolitan 
                                                        
Family: Insanity and Institutions in the Australasian Colonial World, 1860–1914 
(Basingstoke, 2010); James E. Moran, Committed to the State Asylum: Insanity and Society 
in Nineteenth-Century Quebec and Ontario (Montreal and Kingston, 2000). 
8 See Christienna D. Fryar, “The Moral Politics of Cholera in Postemancipation Jamaica,” 
Slavery and Abolition 34, no. 4 (2013): 598–618. 
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models—to colonial administrators at a moment of heightened debate about the kind of 
imperial rule and philanthropic help the freedpeople of the Caribbean should receive. 
Moreover, Bowerbank identified the ways in which the constitutional status quo left patients 
vulnerable, a breach of the governing ethos. In theory, Jamaica’s constitutional structure 
limited direct intervention from London, instead granting significant power to the Jamaican 
legislature, a longstanding source of frustration for imperial administrators. In the late 1850s, 
the Jamaican House of Assembly largely determined island affairs. While the governor could 
veto measures, as could the Colonial Office, the metropolitan government could neither 
mandate particular courses of action nor conduct its own investigations. Moreover, the 
lunatic asylum and public hospital came under the direct authority of the legislature.9 The 
Colonial Office saw these constitutional constraints as justification for an initially neutral 
stance in the early years of the scandal. 
Ultimately, the scandal was so explosive because, within it, two contradictory 
political impulses about postemancipation imperial governance collided. On the one hand, by 
the late 1850s––after two decades in which black Jamaicans prioritized their autonomy over 
the needs of the plantation system––there was growing cynicism about whether freedpeople 
would ever conform to European moral codes and work practices. In the wake of severe 
                                                        
9 See Frederick Madden, ed., with David Fieldhouse, The Dependent Empire and Ireland, 
1840–1900: Select Documents in the Constitutional History of the British Empire and 
Commonwealth, Vol. V (Westport, CT, 1991), 129–151; Thomas Holt, The Problem of 
Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 (Baltimore, 1992), 
181–2, 215–61; Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English 
Imagination 1830–1867 (Chicago, 2002), 203–4; CO 137/347/293–4, Earl of Carnarvon to 
Earl of Shaftesbury, 30 May 1859. 
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economic decline, white observers registered their disappointment by criticizing the work 
ethic and morality of freedpeople; out of the accumulation of these criticisms emerged new 
versions of racist ideology.10 On the other hand, imperial actors still claimed to operate under 
principles of benevolent governance, ideas that stemmed from the abolitionists’ insistence 
that black subjects required protection from the predations of plantation owners and their 
allies. The asylum scandal was caught in the nexus of these two narratives. If black subjects 
were owed protection—and most asylum patients were black or brown and had been born 
into enslavement, making them precisely those abolitionists had rallied British politicians to 
protect—then they deserved the same standards of care as their white British counterparts. 
But those who believed in the inherent inferiority of freedpeople questioned whether British 
models were in fact suitable for this population. Thus, as the scandal grew into a transatlantic 
debate over which treatment methods ought to be used in the colonies, it did so at a moment 
in which black subjects were increasingly seen as undeserving of the benevolence they were 
supposedly receiving. 
 
The model 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, the British model of lunacy treatment was itself new, in 
flux, and only partially implemented across the United Kingdom. For most of the eighteenth 
century, insanity treatments had emphasized the physical control and domination of patients 
in order to break through their mental defenses. Such domination took the form of violent 
corporal punishment or, even for those who wanted whippings and beatings to end, restraints. 
The lunacy reform movement, which began in the late eighteenth century, significantly 
                                                        
10 For the most influential treatments of postemancipation politics and the formation of racist 
ideologies, see Holt, Problem of Freedom and Hall, Civilising Subjects. 
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rethought the basic premises of insanity treatment by moving away from domination and 
physical control. Lunacy reforms admired the York Retreat, a Quaker institution built in 1792 
that pioneered “moral treatment,” an ideology that viewed patients as rational subjects who 
could recover from their temporary state of madness only if their moral character was 
primarily attended to. Since physical brutality could not transform character, it had no place 
within moral treatment.11 
Inspired by the ideology of moral treatment, also known as “moral management,” 
British reformers campaigned for a state system of public asylums that applied its tenets. As 
part of their campaign, reformers needed to convince families to choose state-run asylums for 
their mentally ill relatives instead of other private arrangements. They did so by popularizing 
the image of an ideal asylum. Underpinned by moral management precepts, these proposed 
state asylums would offer flexible, individualized care practiced by kind staff. The 
superintendents of these facilities would be a visible presence, visiting patients daily, and 
modeling methods to their staff. The institutions would be small, as would individual wards, 
with patients classified by the severity of their ailments. They would be located in rural 
settings where patients would breathe fresh air and be soothed by beautiful landscapes. Each 
asylum would have ample grounds on which patients could participate in games, recreation, 
and physical labor. Finally, following the path of Hanwell County Asylum, the first large 
asylum to introduce a non-restraint system, the model asylum would banish restraints 
entirely. Parliament passed lunacy reform in 1845 on the strength of this image, creating a 
                                                        
11 Andrew T. Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and Society in Britain, 1700–
1900 (New Haven, 1993), 8–9, 62–3, 87–88, 96–100, 185. See also Karen Haltunnen, 
“Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture,” American 
Historical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1995): 303–334, at 319. 
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national Lunacy Commission and requiring counties and boroughs to build pauper lunatic 
asylums.12 Moral management was now the official metropolitan ideology. 
Yet parliamentary sanction was merely that: approval from London. It did not mean 
swift and even implementation of the desired national system across the United Kingdom. To 
be sure, by the late 1850s, most English and Welsh counties had state asylums operating in 
accordance with moral management principles, although northern English border counties 
and southern Welsh counties, among others, lagged behind.13 In Scotland, however, the 
London-based Lunacy Commission had no authority—Scotland had its own Lunacy 
Commission, created more than a decade after its English counterpart—and the geographical 
and cultural isolation of the Highlands meant that folk practices and in-home care remained 
standard approaches to caring for the insane there until the late 1850s. State asylums were 
only completed in the Highlands in the mid-1860s, and it would take at least a decade before 
these institutions were reliably running on moral management.14 Thus, the colonies were not 
                                                        
12 Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, 121–2, 135, 146–150, 156, 164–165. 
13 See Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism, 10; Chris Philo, A Geographical History of 
Institutional Provision for the Insane from Medieval Times to the 1860s in England and 
Wales: The Space Reserved for Insanity (Lewiston, 2004), 545–9; John Conolly, The 
Treatment of the Insane without Mechanical Restraints, eds. Hunter and MacAlpine (1856; 
rpt. ed., London, 1973), 2. 
14 See Emily S. Donoho, “Appeasing the Saint in the Loch and the Physician in the Asylum: 
The Historical Geography of Insanity in the Scottish Highlands and Islands, from the Early 
Modern to Victorian eras” (PhD diss., University of Glasgow, 2012), introduction, chapters 
1, 5, and 6; Jonathan Andrews, “Raising the Tone of Asylumdom: Maintaining and Expelling 
Pauper Lunatics at the Glasgow Royal Asylum in the Nineteenth Century,” in Joseph Melling 
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the only peripheries where metropolitan ideas had uneven purchase; regions of the British 
Isles were also slower to implement standards dictated by the metropole.15 
Even where moral management was in place in state asylums, its application was 
haphazard, insecure, and ineffective. One of non-restraint’s early proponents, John Conolly, 
the superintendent who oversaw Hanwell’s transition to non-restraint, worried that state 
asylums might revert to restraint methods.16 Moreover, moral management never led to better 
outcomes for patients, even as it remained the core ideology behind lunacy treatment into the 
twentieth century. Instead, state asylums became semi-permanent dumping grounds for 
patients who would almost certainly never leave, which led to a cycle of overcrowding that 
could only be fixed through the construction of new buildings or wings.17 Nevertheless, the 
various commentators in this scandal—both in Jamaica and in Britain—clung to the fixed 
ideology behind this model, seemingly taking little note of its imperfect implementation in 
Britain. 
 
The crusader 
                                                        
and Bill Forsythe, eds., Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800–1914: A social history of 
madness in comparative perspective (Abingdon, 1999), 200–222. 
15 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for making this point. 
16 Scull, “Conolly, John (1794–1866),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2006 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6094, 
accessed 9 Oct 2010]; Conolly, Treatment, 2, 11–12, 19. 
17 Peter McCandless, “‘Build! Build!’ The Controversy over the Care of the Chronically 
Insane in England, 1855–1870,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 53, no. 4 (Winter 1979): 
553–574, at 553–55; Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism, 9–11. 
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If known, these subtleties mattered little to Bowerbank, whose exposé—while condemning 
virtually every aspect of the hospital and asylum—was especially critical of the asylum. The 
Kingston Asylum in some ways had predated the turn to state asylums in the United 
Kingdom. Its origins lay in the public hospital, built in the bustling port city in the 1770s to 
serve European patients. Though not intended to be a facility for the insane, it gradually 
became the primary place to send the mentally ill, beginning in the 1790s. The need for a 
separate but nearby institution grew, and a separate asylum was built in the early 1820s. 
Conditions within declined rapidly and, as one scholar notes, likely did so as the patient 
population increasingly included black subjects.18 While the abominations of slavery, the 
convulsions of emancipation, and indeed the injustices of imperialism itself had a baleful 
influence on the mental health of many black subjects, colonial doctors and bureaucrats 
frequently labelled those unwilling to conform to European behavioral codes as insane.19 
According to Bowerbank, the asylum suffered from overcrowding, which led to violence: “In 
each [cell], three, four, or even fourteen lunatics are locked up at night, to fight and murder 
each other; for there is no one to keep the peace; no one to tell of the awful tragedy till 
morning, when the cells are opened, and the lifeless corpse proclaims the truth in all its 
terrors.” Even worse, in his eyes, was a more sensational crime—“among the males crowded 
into these cells, there is reason to apprehend that sodomy has been committed!!”20 He insisted 
                                                        
18 Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism, 39–40. 
19 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Richard Philcox, transl. (New York, 2004), 
chapter 5; Martin Summers, “‘Suitable Care of the African When Afflicted With Insanity’: 
Race, Madness, and Social Order in Comparative Perspective,” Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 84, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 58–91, at 60. 
20 The exclamation points are his. See Bowerbank, A Letter to the Commissioners, CO 
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that the medical community and the Jamaican government had known about these faults for 
years. The annual reports from hospitals doctors and a letter from former head physician 
Edward Bancroft, all from the 1840s, testified to that fact. So too did long excerpts of letters 
and reports from prominent Jamaican and British medical experts. Legislation from 1843 to 
build a new asylum in response to these criticisms was further proof, even though the 
structure remained unfinished. Bowerbank also pointed to criticisms from the 1850s as 
commentators and government bodies deplored the state of these facilities. Jamaica’s Central 
Board of Health described the threat of both institutions becoming “the birth-place and cradle 
of pestilence and death.”21 By the time of Bowerbank’s writing in 1858, little had changed. 
At the core of Bowerbank’s criticisms was his belief that British standards must be 
implemented in Jamaican institutions, which he supported by drawing upon the writings of 
British experts like William Farr and John Conolly, instrumental figures in the campaign to 
make moral management official asylum policy, even borrowing their language. Farr, 
superintendent of the General Register Office's statistics department, had praised the non-
restraint system in an 1841 article. Bowerbank had evidently studied this article quite closely, 
for some of his comments were unattributed quotations from it. Beyond this borrowing, 
Bowerbank noted that an asylum “intended to be conducted on the modern, or so-called non-
restraint system” required special attention to construction and division of space, so that 
patients could be physically separated by symptoms and severity of illness, eliminating the 
                                                        
137/342/433, 434–495. See also CO 137/338/202, 204–205, Darling to Bulwer-Lytton, 9 
August 1858. 
21 Bowerbank, A Letter to the Commissioners, CO 137/342/454–462; for the specific 
quotation, see fol. 461r. For more about the 1843 legislation, see CO 139/81/51–55, “An Act 
to make provision for the Erection of a Lunatic Asylum.” 
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need for restraints. Hanwell superintendent John Conolly’s work also influenced Bowerbank, 
who noted that “modern” asylums took special care to ease conditions for their patients.22 
 The immediate target of Bowerbank's attacks was Dr. James Scott, head physician of 
the asylum and hospital. Their debate was not about how well the asylum followed the 
English blueprint, but instead about whether the standard was at all appropriate for the 
Jamaican facility. In examining this scandal, some scholars have suggested that while 
Caribbean medical personnel largely agreed to use moral management as their guide, asylums 
failed to meet British standards because of the difficulty adapting them to colonial contexts.23 
Yet the writings of Bowerbank and Scott demonstrate that they fundamentally disagreed 
about the standard's usefulness in Jamaica. These competing narratives established the 
ideological contours of the asylum controversy, which would expand into a colonial—and 
eventually imperial—scandal.  
While Scott admired British establishments, he did not see moral management as a 
                                                        
22 Bowerbank, A Letter to the Commissioners, CO 137/342/444–446. See John M. Eyler, 
“Farr, William (1807–1883),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB), Oxford 
University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9185, accessed 9 Oct 2010]. 
His article is Farr, “Report upon the Mortality of Lunatics,” Journal of the Statistical Society 
of London 4, no. 1 (April 1841): 17–33. The portion of Farr’s work that Bowerbank quoted 
directly (CO 137/342/444–445) can be found on Farr, “Report,” 17–18. The part that 
Bowerbank did not attribute to Farr (on CO 137/342/469) is on Farr, “Report,” 17. The 
portion of Conolly’s work that Bowerbank uses can be found in On the Construction and 
Government of Lunatic Asylums, eds. Hunter and MacAlpine (1847; rpt. ed., London, 1968), 
65–66. 
23 Smith, “Caribbean Bedlam;” and Smith, Insanity, Race and Colonialism, 6, 28. 
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realistic ideology for Jamaican facilities. “It would be well if the Hospital in Jamaica, as well 
as other Institutions in the island, could be assimilated more and more to a European 
standard,” he wrote to Bowerbank, “but, however fervent your aspirations may be on this 
point, I very much fear that the prospect of their realization is rather remote.” Indeed, he went 
further and asked, “Is there a single institution in this country, that will bear favorable 
comparison with analogous establishments in Great Britain?”24 Moreover, Scott pinpointed 
the imperfections of the British model as he noted that murders were also “committed in the 
best regulated Asylums in England and America.”25 
Scott offered another rubric, one that lowered aspirations for what colonial medicine 
could accomplish. It would be better to compare the asylum to its previous condition, not to 
British or European asylums, a standard his institutions would struggle to meet. As Scott 
described, when he first visited the asylum in 1839, “A more ill regulated place I never 
entered; all was confusion, disorder, filth, and coercion.” Little had changed by the time he 
became head surgeon in 1844. Judged by this measure, the asylum showed marked 
improvement, allowing Scott to present a narrative of progress in which the facility moved 
out of its previous squalor under his aegis.26 In this narrative, Scott was savior. 
                                                        
24 James Scott, A Reply to a Letter By Lewis Quier Bowerbank, M. D. Edinburgh, To the 
Commissioners of the Public Hospital and Lunatic Asylum of Kingston, Jamaica, Relative to 
the Present State and Management of these Institutions. By James Scott, M.R.C.S.E. 
(Kingston and Spanish Town: Jordon & Osborn, Printers, 1858), CO 137/338/255, 9 August 
1858. 
25 Bowerbank, A Letter to the Commissioners, CO 137/342/452–453; Scott, A Reply, CO 
137/338/233. 
26 Scott, A Reply, CO 338/225–226, 230. 
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Among the strongest supporters for the asylum's status quo was Jamaica's governor, 
Sir Charles Henry Darling. Unlike most governors, Darling had spent considerable time in 
Jamaica and was intimately familiar with the island's political life. In the 1830s, he had 
completed a stint of military service in the island, and, after retiring from the army in 1841, 
he moved back to Jamaica, where he spent the next six years holding government positions 
and serving on the legislative council. He was the only Jamaican governor who had 
previously served in the Jamaica Assembly.27 Darling was unusually familiar with the asylum 
as well. As an assemblyman, Darling had served on the board that oversaw the initial stages 
of the new asylum building project. That committee singled out two designs: a submission 
from James Harris, the architect who designed Hanwell, and a design created by Dr. Luther 
Bell, the physician in charge of Boston's McLean Asylum. Darling and his colleagues 
selected Harris's design, which was cheaper and more suited to the tropical climate. It also 
required less space and a smaller staff.28 In choosing Harris's design, the commissioners had 
selected someone who had made the “ideal type” a structural reality. 
Darling's familiarity with the asylum likely primed him to support Scott. The 
governor largely adhered to Scott's view: even with its failure to adhere to British standards, 
the asylum was better than anything else Jamaica had to offer. And if the asylum did fail, its 
worst features were likely symptoms of Kingston's poor infrastructure. “[T]he City of 
                                                        
27 Sketch drawn from H. M. Chichester, “Darling, Sir Charles Henry (1809–1870),” rev. 
Brian H. Fletcher, DNB [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7153, accessed 9 Oct 2010]; 
Holt, Problem of Freedom, 254. 
28 Minutes from 12 February 1845 meeting of Asylum Commissioners and a committee 
report on site and design, both found in Jamaica Archives (JA) 1B/5/17/1, Minute Book of 
the Honourable Commissioners for building a Lunatic Asylum, frontispage, 5, 9–11. 
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Kingston itself,” he noted, “is without a system of Drainage and Sewerage and the nuisance 
of Cess-Pools is one to which the best Residences in it are exposed.” In focusing on 
Kingston's infrastructure—which was notoriously poor at the time—Darling rejected 
Bowerbank's claim that facilities of care should aim for higher standards of cleanliness. 
 
There is no doubt that some of the Buildings on the Old Hospital Premises must be 
utterly condemned, when compared with the Modern Hospitals of Europe and 
America and even of some young and flourishing Colonies, but bad as they may be, 
they are nevertheless Abodes very superior to the wretched Hovels to which some of 
the Patients admitted into the Hospital have been accustomed. 
 
This was an even lower standard than Scott had espoused. Though he was motivated by a 
desire to provide some level of medical care to the sick and suffering, Darling saw no value 
in trying to match practices in other colonies, let alone in Britain. Conditions only had to be 
better than “wretched Hovels,” a low bar indeed.29 
Yet even as Darling set his own criteria for evaluating these institutions, his 
comments and subsequent actions betrayed the degree to which he had nonetheless absorbed 
                                                        
29 CO 137/343/129–131, Darling to Bulwer-Lytton, 26 January 1859. For some of the travel 
literature that catalogued the woes of Kingston, see Anthony Trollope, The West Indies and 
the Spanish Main (London, 1968), 11, 13; Joseph John Gurney, A Winter in the West Indies, 
Described in Familiar Letters to Henry Clay, of Kentucky (London, 1840), 93; John Bigelow, 
Jamaica in 1850, Or, The Effects of Sixteen Years of Freedom on a Slave Colony (Urbana, 
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a basic belief in moral management. In describing a recent inspection of the asylum, he noted 
proudly the “clean and comfortable aspect of the place,” especially since no patients were 
restrained.30 He later agreed that the asylum buildings were “very unfavorable to the success 
of curative systems,” but cited financial constraints from the legislature, which controlled the 
purse.31 Still, by early 1859, Darling signed into law a bill that placed the asylum more 
directly under the governor’s authority. It transferred the responsibilities of the board of 
commissioners to one person who held the newly-created position of inspector and director of 
the hospital and asylum and reported directly to the governor.32 
  
The mediators 
For the men of the Colonial Office, the disputes over conditions in the asylum were a local 
matter, one that the governor should investigate himself. Yet Darling did not share this 
understanding of his responsibility as governor. His was a role of arbitration and executive 
power, not of judicial investigation or direct oversight over incarcerating facilities. 
Nevertheless, the Colonial Office asked Darling to investigate Bowerbank’s claims himself.33 
He did so, albeit reluctantly. “[I]t did not occur to me that I could be expected to undertake 
                                                        
30 CO 137/338/208–209, Darling to Bulwer-Lytton, 9 August 1858. 
31 CO 137/340/213–214, Darling confidential to Bulwer-Lytton, 11 December 1858. See 
Holt, Problem of Freedom, 181 on the matter of the Assembly’s control over money. 
32 CO 139/93/252–54, “An Act to amend the Public Hospital and Lunatic Asylum Act 1855” 
(Nineteenth Victoria Chapter four). 
33 CO 137/338/202, 213, 215–218: Darling to Bulwer-Lytton, 9 August 1858; Henry Taylor 
minute, 10 September 1858; Colonial Office draft to Darling, 7 October 1858. CO 
137/340/60, Henry Taylor minute, 28 December 1858. 
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the duties of enquiry in person,” he complained, nothing that he had never done so during 
thirty years of colonial service “in Six Colonies situated in various Quarters of the Globe.”34 
His investigation was cursory, gathering reports from his new inspector, Daniel Trench, and 
from a civil engineer who confirmed the drainage and ventilation problems that plagued 
most, but not all, of the hospital and asylum facilities.35 
London bureaucrats noted Darling’s reluctance. Internal memoranda and penciled 
marginalia reveal a growing interest among Colonial Office staffers in the hostile exchanges 
between the two men. For example, in a late 1858 dispatch, when Darling claimed he had no 
power over the Commissioners, “except the power to dismiss those of the Commissions who 
are not of the Executive committee,” the distinction rang false. Not only did someone pencil 
in “What further power can he want?,” they also noted that the Executive Committee, over 
which the governor claimed to have no control, “consist[ed] of his own officers & is bound to 
assist him according to his own views.” Comments like these were mere marginal scribbling, 
not official pronouncements, but they nevertheless show an internal skepticism even as the 
Colonial Office maintained a publicly neutral position.36 
Colonial Office bureaucrats found it increasingly difficult to sort through the 
                                                        
34 CO 137/340/275–277, Darling to Bulwer-Lytton, 24 December 1858. 
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onslaught of correspondence on the matter. In particular, they struggled to determine what 
was political animus between Darling and Bowerbank and what was urgent. Senior clerk 
Henry Taylor warned that the animosity between the two men was obscuring potentially 
important questions. “[A]s the correspondence already before us shows,” he wrote, “it will be 
very easy...to lose all the facts of public importance in a labyrinth of personal controversy.”37 
Moreover, battle lines were forming between segments of the Kingston political and 
professional elite, all driven by the personality clashes among Bowerbank, Scott, and 
Darling. After several local physicians publicly allied with Bowerbank,38 senior clerk Henry 
Taylor remarked, “The truth is that so many of the medical men in Jamaica have got 
themselves involved in the controversy about the management of the Hospital & Lunatic 
Asylum that the Gov. might well find some difficulty in appg. any one to cooperate with Dr. 
Scott who was not at variance with him.”39 Still, the London bureaucrats had only 
encountered Bowerbank through their reading of his acrimonious correspondence. They did 
not know him, and many internalized the governor’s overwhelming suspicions of the doctor. 
Convinced that no “justice” could be found in Jamaica, Bowerbank traveled to 
                                                        
37 Henry Taylor noted how the animosity between Bowerbank and Darling was getting in the 
way of potentially important questions. He wrote, “as the correspondence already before us 
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Tribune and Daily Advertiser,” Jamaica Tribune and Daily Advertiser, [no page number or 
publication date; Fiddes wrote the letter on 30 June 1859]. 
39 CO 137/345/343–344, office minutes, including Taylor minute, 26 August 1859. 
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London to meet the secretary of state for the colonies, novelist Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton.40 
He arrived in early March 1859, but the Colonial Office rejected his request. Any 
investigation had to happen “in Jamaica & not in England,” they insisted.41 The response was 
the same when a Cornish MP requested an imperial commission investigate.42 Desperate, 
Bowerbank turned to Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 7th Earl of Shaftesbury, a philanthropist, 
evangelical politician, and lunacy reformer. As chair of the Lunacy Commission, Shaftesbury 
oversaw the rolling out of moral management across England and Wales.43 Well versed in 
Bowerbank’s arguments, Shaftesbury called for the imperial government to investigate the 
Jamaican doctor’s charges.44 His involvement was not welcomed.45 
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Jamaica’s constitutional configuration—with so much power resting in the 
Assembly—prevented imperial investigations even in matters of humanitarian concern, and 
officials highlighted these limits when they responded to Shaftesbury. Taylor described the 
earl’s recommendations as “inexpedient, if not impracticable,” likely to offend, “the 
Legislature & the local Authorities in Jamaica.”46 Since “Jamaica is a Colony engaging in the 
forms of responsible Govt,” another staffer wrote, the Colonial Office could not mandate 
directions about even the structural layout of the asylum. To be sure, there was confusion, 
even within the Colonial Office, as to the precise nature of the constitutional arrangement. An 
early draft originally described Jamaica as “a self-governed Colony,” before that phrase was 
crossed out and replaced in the margins with “engaging in the forms of responsible Govt.”47 
Still, these bureaucrats characterized the Jamaican legislature as “jealous of its authority” and 
likely to “refuse anything which might be demanded of it in a spirit of dictation & 
reproach.”48 Accordingly, neither the Colonial Office nor the Lunacy Commission could send 
investigators.49 
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While by many measures, Bowerbank’s trip seemed a failure—he never met with 
secretary of state Bulwer-Lytton or his successor, the Duke of Newcastle, nor had the 
Colonial Office intervened in the controversy—his trip expanded the scope of the scandal, 
which now had a metropolitan dimension. By calling on Shaftesbury for help, he inserted the 
Lunacy Commission into the scandal, an organization deeply invested in the principles of 
moral management. Their presence validated the argument that British standards were the 
only suitable model for colonial institutions. Furthermore, after his visit, Colonial Office 
staffers began to send copies of most asylum-related dispatches from Jamaica to the 
Commissioners, frequently with questions about standard asylum practice, another tacit 
promotion of the British model.50  
Bowerbank’s visit also sparked an airing of his concerns in the British press, as 
articles spoke pointedly toward the broader ideals of British humanitarianism that Jamaican 
officials were abandoning. In an August 1859 editorial in the Times, written by someone 
called “B,” likely Bowerbank, the author praised the reformed asylums in Britain. Moral 
management’s success should have inspired British colonial administrators, he wrote. 
Instead, “[l]ocal divisions, local bickerings, and party politics are seen to becloud the mental 
vision of the colonial administrators when the interests of the insane are put forward.” 
Moreover, the author insisted, the conditions within the asylum were a stain on the empire 
more broadly. “One would hesitate to credits its existence in an English settlement, and still 
more so in one so long administered under the British crown,” he wrote. “It is a disgrace, a 
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blot upon the civilization of the people of Jamaica, allied as they are to the British nation.” In 
other words, by not implementing moral management, the colonial administration was failing 
to uphold British precepts of humanitarianism and philanthropy.51 Articles of this kind 
functioned in two ways.52 Not only did they bring the Kingston asylum case to the attention 
of a larger public, they also identified “moral management” as the epitome of English—at 
times, British—imperial values, making colonies that chose not to import this standard 
insufficiently English. 
 
The proofs 
 One thing was clear after Bowerbank’s trip: only a certain kind of evidence—
incontrovertible proof of patients clearly harmed by treatment regimens that went against 
both moral management and imperial ideas of good governance—could push the Colonial 
Office to disrupt the constitutional arrangement. Reports of this kind were most valuable, 
moreover, if they had clear human stakes. Two such revelations emerged in 1860, and 
together they convinced the Colonial Office to intervene. The first was the testimony 
presented to the Jamaica Assembly that mortality rates were, at 27% a year, higher than they 
should have been.53 Even accounting for patients suffering from poverty, old age, or other 
ailments, Colonial Office clerks still felt the death toll was too high, especially after the 
Lunacy Commissioners reported that “a well conducted County Asylum in England” usually 
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had mortality rates between 11 and 12 percent.54 Once again, both the Commissioners and the 
Colonial Office affirmed the British institution as the guide for best practices, appropriate 
conditions, and acceptable death rates. 
The second revelation—that asylum staff were not merely failing to implement moral 
management but were instead actively abusing women patients—was even more significant 
and truly galvanized metropolitan action. It also came from a surprising source. Ann Pratt, a 
mixed-race Jamaican woman in her late twenties, was admitted to the asylum in January 
1860, after legal proceedings against the men she accused of raping her turned against her 
instead. She left the asylum in July 1860, and days later, sent Darling a copy of a pamphlet 
she had written, along with a request that he send a copy to the “Colonial Minister.” In Seven 
Months in the Kingston Lunatic Asylum, and What I saw There, published, and perhaps 
written, with the help of Bowerbank, Pratt recounted numerous incidents of staff violence 
toward patients, abuses she had either experienced herself or witnessed. Nurses and 
attendants dragged patients around the grounds, punched and hit them repeatedly, teased and 
mocked patients who asked for food or assistance. At times, they enlisted other patients to 
help them carry or drag patients around. Women were most frequently subjected to this 
abuse, and the pregnant, ill, and elderly were not spared.55 
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Especially damning were Pratt’s descriptions of a practice she called “tanking,” 
whereby asylum staff dunked patients in bathing tanks and held them underwater. Tankings 
frequently functioned as punishment and, according to Pratt, they could be lethal. One elderly 
woman, Margaret Reed, died days after a tanking. Louise Cochran also died, a few days after 
her mother had discharged her from the asylum. Overseeing all of this violence, including 
tanking, was the asylum’s matron, Judith Ryan, who routinely beat patients, stole their food, 
and coerced them into providing labor in her personal home. Pratt’s writing made clear that 
the asylum was, at best, a place of incarceration rather than care. At worst, it brought patients 
more torment and potentially death.56 
Seven Months marked the major turning point in this scandal. First, the pamphlet 
sharpened the focus on the asylum specifically, for while the physical conditions within the 
hospital were poor, it was only in the asylum where patients were viciously punished for 
being ill. More importantly, Pratt’s narrative injected real stakes into what had previously 
been an abstract debate over asylum standards. Bowerbank had never mentioned tanking or 
staff violence toward patients in his original pamphlets—given his thoroughness, he must 
have been unaware of tanking—and the violence he did mention was that between patients. 
To be sure, he had insisted that patients were suffering due to the poor conditions, but now 
London officials were reading about the severe beatings of the most vulnerable of women. It 
was no longer the abstract conditions that were harming patients, but the people tasked to 
take care of them. This was a problem that could no longer be fixed by relying on Jamaican 
officials, especially not now that prominent metropolitan observers were paying attention to 
the case’s developments. 
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Moreover, tanking swiftly came to represent all asylum violence. Colonial Office 
bureaucrats considered tanking unusual and unacceptable, proof that the Kingston facility 
was not operating under moral management. After the pamphlet’s arrival in London, officials 
began to ask serious questions about asylum practices. Moreover, Seven Months may have 
also inspired other patients to fight against their tormentors. In a September 1860 letter, head 
physician Scott claimed that patients believed they could invoke Bowerbank’s name to block 
further abuse. “It is remarkable,” he complained, “that the name of Doctor Bowerbank is 
constantly introduced by them, especially when they are directed to do anything in the 
Institution....they then threaten to make complaints to that person, and express their 
determination to see him so soon as they leave the Asylum.”57 Pratt had met Bowerbank soon 
after she was released from the asylum, and so the specifics of her experience must have 
become common knowledge, as patients used Bowerbank’s name as a weapon to stave off 
violence.58 
The new focus on tanking continued during the spring 1861 trial of Matron Ryan and 
three asylum nurses for an assault on Harriett Jarrett, a patient who had died in the asylum in 
either late May or early June 1860. Jarrett had reportedly entered the asylum in decent 
physical health but was then battered and tanked repeatedly by Ryan and the nurses. Pratt and 
another patient, Henrietta Dawson, both described Ryan hitting Jarrett with her hands and 
other implements. Jarrett was also tanked and submerged underwater. Yet the defense 
successfully argued that Jarrett had entered the asylum in poor physical condition. An array 
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of witnesses, including nurses, washerwomen, and medical staff, including Scott, testified 
that she was feeble, riddled with venereal diseases, and “deranged.” After no more than five 
minutes’ deliberation, the jury found the women innocent.59 Darling chose not to reinstate 
them.60 
Their acquittal only amplified metropolitan concerns about tanking, and the Duke of 
Newcastle’s skeptical response to the news demonstrated the Colonial Office’s deep 
engagement with the problems in Jamaica.61 Newcastle and his colleagues now believed 
Bowerbank, and with this new conviction came a drive to seek the truth about the asylum, 
regardless of what Darling, Scott, or trial verdicts might say. Not only did the Colonial Office 
demand a more detailed account of trial proceedings—Darling’s initial dispatch was sparse, 
with no accompanying documents to explain the trial or the verdict—but Newcastle pressed 
specifically for information about whether “‘tanking’ has been restored to in the Lunatic 
Asylum...for purposes of punishment, discipline or intimidation.”62 He was not easily 
mollified by Darling’s insistence that tanking was an unavoidable accident, caused primarily 
by the mental defects and volatility of black Jamaicans. He explained: 
 
[t]here are few people for whom so much allowance should be made in respect to 
occasional loss of temper and exhibition of force, as those whose natural passions 
have not been moderated by civilizing influences, and who being themselves of what 
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may be called an African temperament are charged as subordinate Servants with the 
duty of handling and restraining violent lunatics for the most part of the same 
excitable Race.63 
 
Here, Darling was tapping into common ideas about black intelligence and laziness that were 
circulating throughout postemancipation imperial networks, including the Colonial Office. 
Yet while well-known in the Colonial Office—senior West India Office clerk Henry Taylor 
had expressed some sympathy with these views—the horror of tanking surmounted these 
beliefs.64  
 
The verdicts 
 In 1861, under continued imperial pressure, the Jamaican legislature created a local 
commission that conducted “a searching enquiry” into conditions in the hospital and asylum. 
The five-person panel included members of the legislative council, a Supreme Court assistant 
judge, and deputy inspector-generals of the army and naval hospitals.65 Each commissioner 
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was granted the powers of judges and could jail those who refused to appear before the 
panel.66 The commission held meetings at the Kingston courthouse for several months. The 
first witness was Bowerbank, who spent two days repeating his exhaustive criticisms of both 
facilities. “[T]he present Lunatic Asylum will never allow the moral or modern treatment to 
be pursued,” he insisted.67 The commissioners then interviewed an impressive array of 
witnesses: doctors (including head physician James Scott), nurses, other staff members and 
some of their lovers, Inspector Trench, patients, friends and relatives of patients, and other 
visitors. Ann Pratt’s case came up repeatedly: not only did she appear before the committee 
several times but witnesses, including the wife of the ship’s captain, also testified to her 
sanity before her admission to the asylum and the dreadful condition she was in after she 
left.68 By November 1861, the Commission finished its investigation and submitted its report 
to the governor. 
The commission's findings vindicated Bowerbank completely. At no point “ha[d] 
anything like systematic curative treatment” been the main goal, they wrote. Instead, medical 
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staff focused more on physical ailments than mental ones, and indeed the institution more 
likely worsened the condition of patients than cured them.69 Tanking was the most evocative 
symbol of widespread neglect. The commissioners gave it “the first and most prominent 
place” in their report, for it had occasionally hastened the death of the women who 
experienced it. Tanking “was the established punishment and means of coercion,” they 
explained. Moreover, “[t]hat the dread of it might sink as deeply as possible into the insane 
mind, it was the frequent practice to threaten it one day, and not carry out the threat till the 
following.” The practice did not end until after Matron Ryan's dismissal in summer 1860.70 
While the doctors may not have known the full extent of the violence in the asylum, the 
commissioners acknowledged, they likely suspected and chose not to investigate. That these 
physicians would have turned a blind eye was “a dereliction of the gravest character.”71 Yet, 
the commission found, Scott was compromised. He had owed money to Matron Ryan and her 
husband, a former superintendent of the men's asylum. He “left the control of the asylum 
almost entirely in her hands,” they noted, and he could not “too strictly [enquire] into [her] 
management.” His financial entanglements were thus directly responsible for the neglect of 
patients.72 
In their recommendations, the commissioners echoed the received wisdom from the 
Commissioners of Lunacy. First, they praised the plans for the new asylum, which they 
believed was better suited for curing patients. “Lunatics are to find regular and systematic 
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employment” in the asylum's garden. Work mitigated the cruelty of confining patients while 
giving them nothing to do. They also requested that other handicrafts and games be 
introduced, since “[i]n the better managed European asylums these resources are provided.” 
Second, the commissioners suggested an independent inspection system, in which 
knowledgeable physicians oversaw the asylums, not local politicians. These would be the 
men who would frequently inspect the facilities and conduct any required inspections. This 
new system would be more “accordant to the European model,” than the previous system.73 
In the wake of this report, the Jamaican government took up several of the 
commission's recommendations. Although the legislature did not approve the recommended 
£16,000 grant, they did pass bills for two grants of £1,250 each to improve the sewers. An 
additional £2,000 was designated for the new asylum's completion. Darling charged Scott 
“with culpable neglect” and suspended him from his position. In Scott's place, Darling 
installed Dr. Andrew Dunn as temporary Consulting Surgeon, a man chosen for his seniority 
among Kingston physicians.74  
The commission’s report inspired more universal pronouncements from the Colonial 
Office about the role colonial officials had in directly overseeing colonial asylums. Even as 
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Newcastle criticized the Jamaican individuals responsible, he used broad prescriptive 
language to send a message beyond Jamaica. In response to Trench’s claim that his job did 
not include inspecting the asylum at night, Newcastle insisted that “[t]here ought to have 
been no hour of the day or night nor corner of the Hospl. or Asylum in which the Attendants 
cd. have assured themselves that the Inspector might not make his appearance.”75 Similarly, 
Newcastle had prescriptions for Governor Edward Eyre, Darling’s replacement after taking a 
leave of absence in March 1862.76 The governor’s duty was to make unannounced inspects to 
all incarcerating facilities—hospitals, prisons, lepers’ asylums, workhouses, and “all public 
institutions of the same nature over which he has a controuling [sic] power.” On such visits, 
governors needed to inspect every corner of these premises thoroughly, “not merely to those 
portions to which the persons in charge of them may propose to conduct him.” They also 
needed to interview privately facility residents.77 
Newcastle’s pronouncements were universal in tone because his audience was 
broader than Jamaica’s governors. Indeed, the revelation that such crimes had been endemic 
in the Kingston asylum cast suspicion on similar institutions in other colonies, and the 
Colonial Office wondered whether Darling’s approach was typical of governors, not an 
unfortunate exception. Henry Taylor noted that colonial governors might have assumed that 
these institutions were not their responsibility, since in England, “Hospls. are generally 
supported by voluntary contributions & supervised by those who support them.” This had 
certainly been Darling’s view as well. But this assumption, if it was widely held among 
governors, was now firmly rejected by metropolitan bureaucrats: overseeing these institutions 
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was now one of the governor’s responsibilities.78 
 
Conclusion 
 In the end, Bowerbank won. Despite the limits of moral management, the Colonial 
Office upheld it as the British approach to asylum treatment against which colonial 
institutions were to be judged, with tanking the most potent symbol of a colony’s grievous 
departure from metropolitan practice. The lessons from Jamaica were applied widely across 
the empire, at least at first. Since the Colonial Office believed the Kingston asylum was 
symptomatic of a broader imperial problem, the senior West Indies clerk, Henry Taylor, 
produced a questionnaire sent to each colonial governor. The Colonial Office received thirty-
three reports, which officials used to produce a final document that ordered colonial asylums 
to implement moral management throughout their facilities.79 Moral management was now 
doubly confirmed: its elevation to official guiding standard for colonial asylums also 
reasserted it as the sanctioned protocol for British asylums. Furthermore, with governors now 
in charge of enforcing moral management in the colonies, the Colonial Office was manifestly 
pursuing bureaucratic as well as medical solutions to public health problems. 
 The asylum scandal demonstrates the value of a more capacious approach within 
British historiography to the postemancipation period in the Caribbean. Currently, the 
literature conceives of the period quite narrowly, both in temporal and thematic terms. 
Scholars often implicitly treat this phase as lasting about three decades, from 1834/38–1865, 
during which time, the economic underpinning of the plantation economies collapsed and the 
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“official mind” shifted away from the Americas to the more promising African, 
subcontinental, and Pacific colonies. To be sure, this shift had cultural dimensions as well, as 
the civilizing mission gave way to a more pessimistic and cynical view of black subjects, one 
intimately bound up in emerging theories of biological racial difference that reached its 
apogee in 1865–1866, when Crown Colony rule was imposed, stripping black subjects of 
political power.80 Yet even this cultural shift was very much tied to labor concerns, a 
predominant theme within postemancipation scholarship. 
 The asylum scandal provides a path to thinking about broader conceptions of 
postemancipation rule. First, this was not a crisis primarily about labor but instead about the 
imperial government’s responsibility to the chronically ill, who were at the constant whim of 
the state. Public institutions like asylums, hospitals, and prisons were intimate points of 
contact between freedpeople and the state, places where tonal shifts in imperial rule had swift 
and brutal impact on the daily lives of black subjects. Second, the scandal tested the 
humanitarian commitments of the British Empire. Decades after abolition, the plight of black 
subjects could still animate limited forms of humanitarian politics. Limited, because the 
question at the heart of this debate was the following: with humanitarian concerns still 
dictating the politics of care in nineteenth-century Britain, were the black imperial subjects of 
the Caribbean owed the same standards of care as their white counterparts in the metropole? 
And if they were, was the imperial state responsible for ensuring that metropolitan standards 
were met? These were questions that reflected the previous two decades of postemancipation 
conflicts between freedpeople and white Britons. As white commentators grew more cynical 
about emancipation, they began to depart from the early abolitionist ethos that blacks were in 
theory due the same treatment as white subjects. As these debates grew more heated, asylum 
patients, and other freedpeople, were caught between clashing ideologies of rule. 
                                                        
80 Hall, Civilising Subjects. 
35 
 The scandal occurred toward the end of the postemancipation period (as 
conventionally understood), but its aftermath was shaped by the turmoil of the 1860s. If the 
1860s marked the enshrining in law of the cynical, racist pessimism about the capacity of 
black subjects, then the true measure of what freedom from slavery accomplished is best 
assessed after that legal marker, not before. The state of the asylum before the scandal proved 
to be a prescient indicator: the conditions in which patients suffered before Bowerbank’s 
intervention—and the racism toward freedpeople that allowed such neglect to set in—
prefigured post-1860s attitudes to black subjects. The scandal’s immediate aftermath may 
have reasserted the rights of black subjects to the same standards of care as white Britons. 
But in practice, the results were much less salutary, as Darling’s racism more accurately 
reflected daily conditions in the asylum, where any improvements were limited and 
temporary. While the new asylum was eventually finished, and an English physician sent to 
Jamaica to oversee it, the legislature never fully funded refurbishment plans, nor did the 
hospital ever receive promised drainage improvements. Within decades of the scandal, the 
asylum was once again notorious for its abominable conditions.81 
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